

as Senator DASCHLE and others have suggested, reconcile the various bills that have been introduced on this issue. I do not expect to have the last word on this matter.

Senator SNOWE and I are very proud the financing of our legislation received 54 votes in the Senate when it came up last year. On the Snowe-Wyden amendment, we saw Senator WELLSTONE vote for it, Senator SANTORUM vote for it, Senator KENNEDY vote for it, and Senator ABRAHAM vote for it. That is a pretty good coalition. That is the kind of coalition we can build if we pick up on the counsel of Senator DASCHLE, and I know a number of Republican leaders, to come together and reconcile these various bills.

I intend to keep coming to the floor and reading these cases. Our friend, Senator KERREY, is here. I know he is going to be speaking on an important issue, and I do not want to detain him. I think in this country we are now seeing older people break their pills in half because they cannot afford to pick up the cost of medicine when we have, as we saw in Tillamook, OR, 80-year-old women being taken to emergency rooms and not able to afford their medicine. It is wrong. It is just wrong for this Congress to not address this issue in a bipartisan way this year.

This is not one we ought to put off until after the election and see it used as a political football. It should not be used as fodder for the campaign trail because if it is, too many older people who cannot afford their medicine are going to suffer.

We have a chance to move on a bipartisan basis to reconcile these various bills. I intend to keep coming to the floor of this body again and again to describe these cases, to show how urgent the need is. The President at the State of the Union Address made it clear he was extending the olive branch to both political parties to work with him on this issue. We ought to seize, on a bipartisan basis, the opportunity to use private health insurance, not some federalized Government program, to make sure we meet the needs of older people for prescription medicine.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

CONFRONTING NUCLEAR THREATS

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, a few weeks ago, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger joined what has become a chorus of distinguished citizens and representatives who are suggesting the decision to deploy the national missile defense system be postponed until after the November 7 Presidential election. Although it may be that a delay is necessitated for other reasons, I hope we do not allow the approach of a Presidential election to prevent us from making important foreign policy decisions.

Not only do I believe this to be a precedent which would hamper future Presidential decisionmaking, but it also ignores the fact that this is a tough decision for any President to make anytime, regardless of the circumstances. It also ignores that it takes time for a new Commander in Chief at the helm of the ship to get his or her foreign policy sea legs. Such a delay could jeopardize our capacity to deploy NMD in a timely fashion.

In his argument, Secretary Kissinger referred to "congressionally imposed deadline." This is a commonly made mistake about what Congress did last year. All we called for was deployment of national missile defense "as soon as it is technologically possible." The administration has said this decision could be made as early as June and has recently indicated this could slip to late summer.

Of the four criteria that will be used by President Clinton to make his decision, the most difficult to quantify is the impact on other arms control agreements. Specifically, the impact most feared is that deployment of this missile defense system would be regarded by the Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

While I can make a very strong argument that deployment of NMD is permitted under the terms of this treaty, this argument will diminish in importance if the Russian Government abrogates other treaties by modifying their strategic nuclear weapons. This includes the very real and destabilizing prospect of re-MIRVing their missiles or converting single-warhead missiles to multiwarhead missiles. This is why the United States is attempting, and thus far without success, to persuade Russia to allow a modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build NMD and avoid potentially serious conflict between the United States and the Russian Government. We have met considerable resistance, not only from the Russians but also from allies who regard our analysis of the ballistic missile threat to be flawed.

To be clear, the new threat is real. We cannot afford to ignore the real threat that an accidental or rogue nation launch of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons poses to the survival of our Nation. The need to build this defensive system, which is still being tested for feasibility and reliability, derives from the national intelligence estimate and an external panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld. Both have concluded that the threat of rogue nation or unauthorized launch of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon at the United States of America is real.

As a consequence, we have begun testing a system which would protect Americans against this threat. A test schedule for May will be critically important to demonstrate feasibility and reliability, one of the four Presidential conditions needed for deployment.

Given the risk/reward ratio of defending against nuclear weapons, the current cost estimates over 10 years of an amount that is less than 1 percent of our national defense budget and the unlikely reassessment of this threat, all that would stand in the way of a Presidential decision to deploy would be the potential adverse impact on other agreements.

The President will face this question: Will a decision to deploy NMD result in other nations, especially Russia, reacting in a manner that would produce a net increase in proliferation activity and thus increase the potential for rogue or unauthorized launch of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons?

We are more likely to resolve this potential conflict in a way that increases the safety and security of Americans if President Clinton does not delay the decision until after the November 7 election. This is a decision that should be made on the basis of the current facts and the four criteria for deployment previously outlined by the administration.

To be successful, we should also consider an alternative negotiating strategy that would pose a win-win for both the United States and Russia. It would reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It would improve the relations between the United States and Russia. And it would enable the United States to redirect money from maintaining our current nuclear weapons stockpile to our conventional forces, where a real strain can be seen in recruitment, readiness, and capability.

To spur constructive action, we must force ourselves to remember this grim truth: The only thing capable of killing every man, woman, and child in the United States of America is the Russian nuclear stockpile. We must remember the threat no longer comes from a deliberate attack. Instead, these weapons now present two new and very dangerous threats.

The first is the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a Russian nuclear weapon. During the cold war, we worried about the military might of the Soviet Union, but today we worry about the military weakness of Russia and her ever-decreasing ability to control the over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads in her arsenal. There are numerous stories that have emerged out of Russia over the past few years highlighting the vulnerability of these weapons. There are stories of major security breaches at sensitive nuclear facilities. There are stories of unpaid Russian soldiers attempting to sell nuclear-related material in order to feed their families. And there are stories of the continuing decay of the command and control infrastructure needed to maintain the nuclear arsenal of Russia. Each of these demonstrates the vulnerability of the Russian arsenal to an accidental launch based on a technical error or miscalculation or the unauthorized use of a weapon by a rogue group or disgruntled individual.

The second threat posed by the nuclear legacy of the cold war is the danger of the proliferation of material, technology, or expertise. Consider just the case of North Korea. Last summer, North Korea held the world's attention as a result of indications that they were preparing to test a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile. Through skillful diplomacy, the United States was able to convince the North Koreans to halt their missile testing program.

However, the stability of the entire east Asian region was in jeopardy as a result of the possibility of such a test. North Korea is one of the most backward countries in the world. It is a country where millions of its own citizens have starved to death. Yet this country was able to affect the actions of the United States, Japan, and China as a result of their ability to modify what is, in truth, outdated Soviet missile technology. As has been indicated publicly, the Taepo Dong is little more than a longer range version of the 1950s Soviet Scud missile. One can only imagine the consequences to our security if North Korea had a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. But this illustrates the threat posed by proliferation. Without real management of these materials and technology—much of it Russian in origin—it will become easier for third and fourth rate powers to drastically affect our own security decisions.

Both of these threats—accidental or unauthorized launch and proliferation of these weapons to rogue nations—present a new challenge to the United States. It is a challenge very different from the cold war standoff of two nuclear superpowers. Classic deterrence, better known as mutual assured destruction, was the bedrock of our policy to confront nuclear threats during the cold war. Mutual assured destruction was based on the premise that our enemies would not dare to attack the United States as long as they knew that such an attack would be met with an overwhelming, deadly response by the United States. This theory, however, provides no safety from an accidental launch caused by the failure of outdated technology. It provides no safety net from the use of these weapons by a terrorist state whose only objective is the death of as many Americans as possible.

We need to develop a completely new and comprehensive approach to confront these threats. National missile defense will not add to our security if it is built as a stand alone venture. As part of a comprehensive approach it most assuredly can. To succeed, we should work with Russia to develop a new strategic partnership. We need a partnership based on cooperation, not confrontation—a partnership that builds on the many areas of mutual concern, not those that divide—a partnership that recognizes the nuclear legacy of the cold war threatens all of us, and that only by working together can we truly reduce this threat.

The possibility of a new approach where our interests intersect with those of Russia can be seen in a proposal made by Russia to our arms control negotiators in Geneva. The Russians offered to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 on each side. We rejected the offer based on an assessment of minimum deterrence levels that are 500 to 1,000 strategic warheads higher. But this assessment has been overtaken by events in Russia which now make it likely the Russians will be unable to safely maintain more than a few hundred of their own nuclear weapons.

As the Russian capability to maintain their stockpile dwindles, it is natural to assume our threshold for deterrence will also significantly decrease. Thus, by keeping more weapons than we need to defend our national interests, we are encouraging the Russians to maintain more weapons than they are able to control. The net effect is to increase the danger of the proliferation or accidental use of these deadly weapons which decreases the effectiveness of national missile defense.

So, here is the outline of a win-win proposal to the Russians. We jointly agree to make dramatic reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal. We jointly agree that national missile defense is an essential part of a strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. And, we jointly agree that parallel reductions in our nuclear forces must include arrangements—and a Congressional commitment to provide funding—to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material.

We are fortunate that we will not begin from scratch on this problem. We can build upon one of the greatest acts of post-cold war statesmanship: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. To facilitate these dramatic reductions, we must look for ways to expand upon the success of this program, to enlist new international partners, and to work with the Russians to find new solutions to the problems of securing nuclear material. Additionally, we should continue our lab-to-lab efforts that are assisting the transition of Russian nuclear facilities and workers from military to civilian purposes. These are the practical, on the ground programs that will help us reduce the chance of the proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how.

In exchange for deep nuclear reductions and technical assistance, the Russians would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty. With this alternative, the President would not have to choose between national missile defense and future cooperation with Russia. Instead, by working in cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive basis, we will be able to deploy a limited NMD system designed to protect the United States from accidental or rogue state ballistic missile launches.

We can reach such an agreement with Russia because the Russian people now know they are not immune from the

threats of extremism. Their security is also endangered by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states. This now presents us with an opportunity to begin to work with Russia diplomatically to confront this emerging threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's success in halting North Korea's missile testing program highlights the potential power of diplomacy to reduce these threats. But by developing a strategic partnership with Russia, and working cooperatively to bring change in North Korea, to end Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, or to foster real reform in Iran, we will reduce nuclear dangers and create a safer world.

So as President Clinton considers his decision about NMD, I hope he considers an alternative strategy that embraces a comprehensive approach to the threats we face in today's world. Now is the time to reach out to Russia and to create a partnership that will build the basis for securing the post-cold war peace for our children.

Mr. President, in the aftermath of the administration's rejection of the offer to substantially reduce strategic weapons, the issue of a previous analysis of the minimum deterrence done by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, was raised. I say to my colleagues, I intend to read carefully that report and revisit the floor with an opportunity to discuss what I believe is a rational minimum deterrence level necessary to protect the people of the United States of America. Obviously, that must be a concern of ours as well.

But I believe there is a historic opportunity. It will be difficult for us to seize that opportunity if Republicans and Democrats do not agree that still the most important thing for all of us to do is to make certain the safety and security of the American people are secured through not only our policies but our active efforts.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Iowa is recognized.

MONITORING DRUG POLICY

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, while we were away for the winter break, the annual high school survey on drug use trends among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders came out. This annual Monitoring the Future study, released on December 17, revealed little change in trends of illicit drug use among our young people. The administration has tried to put a happy face on the results. But there is little to be happy about.

Although the Monitoring the Future study found that the increase in drug use among teens has slowed down, what the data show is that use and experimentation remain at high levels. You can see from this chart that we still face the discouraging fact that nearly 50 percent of our high school seniors reported use of marijuana, not only in